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RELEASED TIME AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTI:
A FURTHER REPLY

Paul G. Kauper*
his "Reply"1 to the writer's review of his excellent book, Mr.
Pfeffer has singled out the part of the review in which the writer
discussed the released-time problem and the position taken by Mr.
Pfeffer with respect thereto. To prolong the arguments over this matter in the pages of this Review would he unprofitable, hut the writer
feels that a few comments on Mr. Pfeffer's reply would not he out of
order.
Mr. Pfeffer correctly points out that the Pierce case3 as originally
decided seemed to rest on the ground that parents could claim a constitutional freedom to send children to schools of their own choosing
so long as these schools met general standards prescribed by law. It
did not rest distinctly on the basis of religious freedom. But, as Mr.
Pfeffer concedes, the case has come to he interpreted over the years as
representing an important phase of religious liberty in so far as the
freedom of parents to send their children to parochial schools is concerned.
The point is made, however, by Mr. Pfeffer that the constitutional
position of the parochial school must he determined by the secular
education that it affords children. It is because a parochial school
provides a secular education that parents may properly discharge their
obligation under the compulsory education laws by sending their children to parochial schools, and it is for this reason that school hoards
may constitutionally reimburse parents for their costs in transporting
children to parochial schools. In short, according to this argument, the
religious atmosphere of the parochial school, the avowed importance
of the parochial schools in the church's whole scheme of things, and
the specific instruction in religious subjects are all to he treated as
irrelevant in appraising the constitutional significance of such schools.
Having established this premise, Mr. Pfeffer proceeds to criticize
the writer's argument that the right of parents to send their children
to parochial schools has some relevancy to the constitutional problem
raised in regard to released time. Mr. Pfeffer charges the writer with
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employing the "whole is greater than any of its parts" argument and
proceeds to demonstrate by the use of algebraic equations that the
writer was comparing unequal things. The writer cheerfully concedes
that parochial school education and released time instruction are not
equals and do not stand in the same class. Indeed, the problem before
the Court in the McCollum4 and Zorach5 cases would have been far
simpler if the problem of released time had been seen to be a minor
version of the parochial school problem, for apparently all members of
the Court that decided these cases would have voted to affirm the
Pierce case. The writer recognized the differences in his review when
he stated that the right of parents to send their children to parochial
schools was a constitutional right, whereas parents could claim no constitutional right to secure released time for their children.
The writer used the Pierce case as having some relevancy to the
chief argument made by those who oppose released time on constitutional grounds, namely, that the state is compelling or coercing children
to attend religious education classes. According to this argument a
child is coerced to attend religious education classes because it is given
the privilege of either attending such classes or remaining in the public
school during this period. This argument rests on the penal theory
regarding the nature of the public school. Having to stay there during
the hour in question is a form of punishment or penalty for not attending religious education classes. Mr. Pfeffer finds an analogy in the
case of a judge who threatens punitive consequences for a prisoner if
he does not attend church services regularly every Sunday.
It is quite apparent that when Mr. Pfeffer speaks of "compulsion"
as the constitutional infirmity of the released-time program he is not
speaking of compulsion as a fact but as a legal conclusion. Certainly
all should concede that if school teachers and officers put pressure on
students to attend classes for religious instruction this would be objectionable on constitutional grounds. But Mr. Pfeffer speaks of compulsion in a different sense. 1\.ccording to his position, even if the school
authorities are completely neutral and make no effort to influence the
child's choice, indeed, even if the children were placed under strong
pressure not to attend religious education classes, still there would be
"compulsion" to attend such classes. It is even immaterial, according
to this view, that in fact the majority of children elect not to attend
the religious education classes. The writer adverted to this fact in his
4 McCollum v. Board of Education,
5 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,

333 U.S. 203, 68 S.Ct. 461 (1948).
72 S.Ct. 679 (1952).
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review, but now Mr. Pfeffer makes clear that he regards it as a very queer
argument to suggest that children are not compelled to attend religious
education classes if they are at liberty to attend other classes at the
public school and if in fact the majority of them exercise this liberty.
The "compulsion" Mr. Pfeffer speaks of is a legal conclusion derived from analysis of the released-time program in the light of compulsory education laws. Because parents are required to send their
children to some school for a minimum number of hours each week, it
follows, therefore, whether a child during one of those hours stays at
school or attends a class for religious instruction, he is being coerced
by law to do one or the other, and, therefore, the state is using its
coercive power to recruit children for religious education.
It is at this point that the parochial school situation becomes relevant in the opinion of this writer. In view of the compulsory education
laws, a parent must send his child to some school. He may elect to
send the child to a public school, to a parochial school or to a nonparochial private school. But if we adopt the "compulsion" argument
made with respect to released time, it follows with equal force that
children are "compelled" to attend parochial schools since if they do
not attend these schools they face confinement in either public schools
or other private schools. To paraphrase the statutory requirement we
may make it read in effect that all parents are under a duty to send
their children to parochial schools, provided, however, that they may
be released from this obligation if they send their children to public or
non-parochial private schools. To use the argument of the opponents
of released time, this is coercing children to attend parochial schools.
Yet it is recognized that not only is this permissible but that parents
may insist on the constitutional right to send their children to auy
school of their choice.
Nor is it any answer to say that parents have the right to send their
children to parochial schools only because such schools furnish a secular
education equivalent to that offered by the public schools and that,
therefore, there is no compulsion to attend religious education classes.
Mr. Pfeffer himself severely criticized this argument in his comments6
on the Everson case7 where he endorsed Justice Jackson's dissent in
that case and stated that "authoritative church writings leave little
doubt that the education received in Catholic parochial schools is not
the secular education which a state may constitutionally provide or pay
472-478 (1953).
7Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504 (1947).

6 PFBFFBR, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM
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for." 8 But now in his ''Reply" Mr. Pfeffer, to prove his point that the
parochial school and released-time programs have nothing in common,
adopts the very arguments about the non-religious features of parochial school education which he so vigorously criticized in his book.
The truth is that the parochial school's orientation is religious in character. It is not simply that these schools teach religious subjects. The
entire educational program in these schools derives meaning from
religious faith and belief. And that the compulsory education laws
contribute to the strength of the parochial system cannot be doubted.
The logic of Mr. Pfeffer's argument stated in his "Reply" should lead
him to concede that since parochial schools provide a secular education,
therefore, it should be permissible for the state to pay for the expense
of operating these schools. But a reading of his book makes clear that
he would not make such a concession and that he would look upon
this as a clear case of an unconstitutional use of public funds in aid of
religion.9
In the end, the critical constitutional issues with respect to released
time cannot be solved by any play of language in using the word
"compulsion" or by any argument that treats the public school system
as though it were penal in character. The central problem is one of
balancing of interests. The Zorach case stands for the proposition that
the interest of parents in the religious education of their children is a
legitimate legislative concern and that legislatures may fashion their
school laws so as reasonably to accommodate this interest. The opposing consideration is that under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment no person may be arbitrarily deprived of his life, liberty
.or property. It remains to be demonstrated that the optional released
time privilege deprives anyone of these interests protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
S PFEFFER, CHURCH, STAT.I!, AND FREEDOM
9

Id. at 442-464.
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